Armenia Advances Constitutional Reform as Peace Agreement with Azerbaijan Awaits Formalization

What happened

Armenia and Azerbaijan have moved closer to a peace settlement but have not completed the legal steps needed to bring it into force. The two countries initialed a peace agreement in Washington on August 8, 2025. Initialing indicated that negotiators had settled the text at that stage, but the agreement still requires formal signature and ratification by the relevant authorities in both countries.

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has renewed his commitment to completing those steps. Reporting by ARMENPRESS presents him as saying that he wants the agreement to be signed and ratified before he leaves office. His comments place the treaty within Armenia’s continuing peace process and connect its eventual completion to the political timetable of his government.

At the same time, Armenia is preparing a draft for a new constitution. Armenian officials describe the constitutional process as part of the country’s internal political agenda, rather than as a concession made solely in response to Azerbaijani demands. Azerbaijan disputes that separation. Baku says provisions associated with Armenia’s Declaration of Independence raise concerns about territorial claims and must be addressed before the peace agreement can be finalized.

The common factual picture is therefore one of an unfinished peace process alongside a pending constitutional reform. Both governments continue to express support for peace in principle, but they differ over the relationship between the two tracks. Armenia emphasizes its intention to proceed toward signature and ratification while managing its own constitutional process; Azerbaijan continues to link formalization of the agreement to changes in Armenia’s constitutional and foundational legal framework.

How each side reports it

Armenian coverage, represented here by ARMENPRESS, puts the emphasis on Pashinyan’s stated objective and on the distinction between an agreement that has been initialed and one that has been formally concluded. The central storyline is that Armenia’s leadership remains committed to finishing the peace deal during the prime minister’s tenure. This framing treats the constitutional discussion as a parallel domestic matter and gives priority to the government’s pledge to complete the treaty rather than to Azerbaijan’s conditions for doing so.

The Azerbaijani outlet AzerNEWS organizes the same developments around Baku’s unresolved concerns. Its account presents the planned Armenian constitution as directly relevant to the peace agreement, even while acknowledging Yerevan’s position that the reform is internally motivated. The terminology and structure of this coverage make the constitutional process a potential legal barrier to normalization. Rather than focusing mainly on Pashinyan’s political deadline, it highlights Azerbaijan’s demand that Armenia address language linked to its Declaration of Independence before the agreement proceeds.

APA gives still greater prominence to the declaration and to Pashinyan’s critical assessment of its text. In that framing, the issue is not simply whether Armenia is drafting a new constitution, but whether existing foundational language can be reconciled with a peace settlement. Azerbaijani reporting connects the declaration to alleged territorial implications and cites the need for constitutional amendments as a prerequisite for signing the treaty. This places responsibility for the remaining delay primarily on unresolved questions within Armenia’s legal order.

The contrast is consequently less about whether a peace agreement exists in draft form than about what remains to be done and who sets the sequence. Armenian reporting foregrounds a bilateral commitment, the difference between initialing and ratification, and Pashinyan’s promise to finish the process. Azerbaijani reporting foregrounds constitutional text, the Declaration of Independence, and Baku’s stated conditions for normalization. Each side’s coverage gives less prominence to the other’s preferred explanation: Armenian accounts do not center Azerbaijan’s constitutional precondition, while Azerbaijani accounts give less weight to Yerevan’s insistence that reform is primarily a domestic political project.